

# **CAN OPERATIONAL ART OCCUR IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR?**

**A MONOGRAPH  
BY  
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Infantry**



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
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
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
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## ABSTRACT

CAN OPERATIONAL ART OCCUR IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR?  
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This monograph asserts that operational art, defined in theory as a conventional warfare concept, applies in military operations other than war (MOOTW). This paper examines the differences between conventional warfare and MOOTW, and shows that many of the planning principles applied in conventional warfare applies to MOOTW but with some modifications.

The monograph first explores the theory of operational art, as described by Dr. James J. Schneider, to determine why operational art theory does not include MOOTW. It then reviews Joint and Army doctrine to determine how doctrine describes MOOTW and operational art, and to assess what impact theory has had in developing operational art doctrine. Lastly, the monograph reviews two post Cold War operations other than war to surface pertinent lessons learned and to identify operational art connections to MOOTW.

The monograph concludes that operational art does apply in MOOTW. It shows that operational art theory is consistent with operational art doctrine for the most part; that doctrine, especially Joint doctrine, supports the planning and execution of MOOTW with tools derived from operational art doctrine; and that operational art can be applied in the planning and execution of MOOTW.

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## CHAPTER I

### THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

#### Introduction

The study of the military theory and the theory of operational art are important for military leaders at all levels. The theory of operational art has dramatically influenced the thinking of leaders and planners for generations. LTG Holder, then Colonel Holder, said in 1990, "The Armed services' projected adoption of operational art as a separate division of military studies is potentially one of the most significant theoretical changes since the formation of the Department of Defense."<sup>1</sup>

Doctrine guides the way tactical and operational forces apply to military situations and develops to avoid the errors of the last war on the next.<sup>2</sup> Doctrine develops from combining theories and applying them to the force. Therefore, theory is a critical aspect of success in future conflicts. The influences of operational art theory impacts on the way U.S. Army officers view the idea of training and mission planning. This influence permeates U.S. Army training and doctrine.

The current generation of graduates from the U.S. Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) learns to view operational art through a conventional warfare framework. The theories and models studied for operational art developed from the study of major conflicts and traditional warfare. This conventional warfare framework excludes the most common military mission, which is Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).<sup>3</sup>

The result of the focus of operational art in a conventional warfare framework

could directly affect the way we plan and conduct MOOTW in the future. The writer will focus on the influence of operational art theory, as taught at SAMS, and the effects of this theory on MOOTW.

### Research Question

This paper seeks to answer the question of whether one can apply operational art to MOOTW? It accomplishes this by examining the available literature on operational art theory, as taught at SAMS, and on MOOTW

This monograph uses several terms, throughout the discussion of operational art, that begs defining. Tenets of Operational Art are eight key attributes in which operational art is manifested to its fullest expression.<sup>4</sup> The writer will further define these eight tenets Chapter II. Conditions of Operational Art are eight conditions that must be present for operational art to exist in its greatest fullness of expression.<sup>5</sup> These are also defined in Chapter II. MOOTW are operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. Soldiers can apply these military actions to complement any combination of national power and can occur before, during and after war.<sup>6</sup> Concepts of Theater and Operational Design is an idea that guides theater and operational level planners in their efforts. These include how to address the center of gravity, lines of operation, decisive points, and culminating point.<sup>7</sup>

### Assumptions

The writer uses two assumptions in this monograph to establish common ground for understanding operational art and MOOTW. The first assumption is that operational art, as theorized by Dr. James J. Schneider, PH.D., sets the standard for SAMS

operational art theory instruction. His ideas represent operational art to the graduates of SAMS. The second assumption is that those MOOTW operations conducted since 1991 are most relevant to this monograph. These operations most closely represent the operations the Army is currently executing or will execute in the near future.

### Analytical Framework

The Napoleonic wars changed the conduct of wars from that time onward. Armies got bigger, and more dispersed on the battlefield. Weapons became more lethal, and professional soldiers emerged from peasant armies. Technology had a profound impact on armies of that period. Technology and the Industrial Revolution led to the emergence of the empty battlefield and the rise of free maneuvers.<sup>8</sup> Those conditions in turn led to the development of operational art.

American armies practiced operational art long before it was an identified notion. SAMS students learn that operational art began in the U.S. Civil War. Dr. Schneider identified U.S. Grant as the first U.S. general to use operational art in a large scale war. Since the time of Grant, our leaders used operational art to be successful in wars, but the idea stayed out of our doctrine until our most recent history.

Dr. James J. Schneider, leading SAMS theorists on operational art, wrote extensively on the subject. In Dr. Schneider's theoretical paper entitled Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art, he lists these eight tenets of operational art: distributed operations, distributed campaigns, continuous logistics, instantaneous command and control, operationally durable formations, operational vision, distributed enemy, and distributed deployment.<sup>9</sup> He also describes eight conditions that



must exist in order for operational art to exist, and these are: Advanced weapon technology, advanced logistics, advanced command and control, operationally durable formations, operational command vision, operationally minded enemy, distributed capacity to wage war through continuous mobilization must support distributed operations.<sup>10</sup>

These tenets and conditions allow the writer to examine U.S. Army and Joint doctrine, and to examine them in historical MOOTW settings. Dr. Schneider's tenets of operational art are the criteria used for examination and comparison. The writer will also examine Dr. Schneider's influence on operational art doctrine at the army and joint level. Finally the writer uses historical examples to determine what positive and negative results doctrinal operational had on the operation.

#### Significance and Key Conclusions of the Study

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, U.S. political and military involvement have increased greatly around the world. Resulting military operations occur in countries with various levels of development and resources, with joint forces of various sizes. These missions vary in scope and length. The Army designed and trained the leaders and forces conducting these new missions to defeat the Soviets on the plains of central Europe. Ensuring that Army forces, train in conventional warfare, and that they can also execute missions in MOOTW, is critical.

The training of leaders and soldiers, in the transition from conventional warfare to MOOTW operations, begins with theory and doctrine. Understanding operational art theory is basic to planning and conducting operations. The leading SAMS theorist on operational art, by definition, excludes the application of operational art in MOOTW.

This monograph challenges this idea by showing that operational art can and does occur in MOOTW. It also concludes that Army doctrine is vague about applying operational art in MOOTW, while Joint doctrine clearly links the two together.

The study of operational art is key to understanding the system for planning and executing operations. Understanding the impact of operational art on any operation is the responsibility of all leaders and planners. MOOTW operations are unique and different from conventional warfare in most ways. With MOOTW operations becoming more common than conventional warfare, it is a subject that deserves study at the theoretical and doctrinal levels.

## CHAPTER II

### REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

In this chapter the writer closely examine operational art as Dr. Schneider describes the notion. This allows the examination of U.S. Army Doctrine and Joint Doctrine, for the purpose of determining connections or disconnections between doctrine and theory.

#### Operational Art Theory

The transition from classical warfare to modern warfare and the transition from classical strategy to operational art were gradual transformation, but the difference was noticeable (see Figure 1.) Operational art as defined by Dr. Schneider is “the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organization of campaigns and major operations.”<sup>11</sup>

CLASSICAL STRATEGY	OPERATIONAL ART
1. Maneuver to contact	1. Battles and engagements begin immediately at the national borders.
2. Armies collide in decisive battle	2. Several armies fight indecisive battles.
3. Logistics is a consideration only in initial phases of a campaign.	3. The only decisive battle is the last battle of the war.
4. Vigorous pursuit after battle.	4. Logistics considerations impose pauses upon operations often before pursuit can be decisive.
5. Campaign ends	5. Wars consist of several campaigns; campaigns consist of several distinct operations; operations consist of distinct battles and maneuvers.
6. Generally war is also terminated.	6. Operational Art is strategy with the added dimension of depth.
7. The commander sees the entire battlefield.	7. The commander sees very little of the many simultaneous battles occurring.

Figure 1 Classical Strategy and Operational Art<sup>12</sup>

This transformation was possible through technology and the industrial age. The industrial age produced more lethal weapons at a very high rate. The effect on warfare caused greater dispersion on the battlefield. These dispersed formations needed guidance toward the same purpose. U.S. Grant was the first general of the U.S. Civil War to direct his armies with a single unified war plan.

During the Virginia Campaign of 1864 we find Grant orchestrating a sequence of simultaneous operations conducted by Sigel's Army of West Virginia, Meade's Army of the Potomac and Butler's Army of the James. Each of the army commanders is in turn sequencing series of battles and maneuvers to achieve some operational objective. Grant in his turn becomes a de facto army group commander. Grant's armies together conduct a major operation in support of the major operation conducted by the group of armies under W.T. Sherman. Both army group major operations were integrated by Grant's overall campaign plan.<sup>13</sup>

In this type of warfare freedom of maneuver may take precedence over the main enemy army. This is the first example of operational art, and it is the basis for Dr. Schneider's theory of operational art.

One can describe the essence of operational art as the employment of forces in deep distributed operations. The factors of planning, executing, and "sustainment of temporally characterized and spatially distributed maneuvers and battles", are all viewed as one organic whole.<sup>14</sup> This is the common understanding of operational art, but Dr. Schneider narrows the focus of this idea by describing tenets and conditions of operational art. Understanding these tenets and conditions is critical because this monograph uses them as criteria for the following examination of doctrine and history.

The first tenet of operational art is the distributed operation. He defines it as:

An ensemble of deep maneuvers and distributed battles extended in space and time but unified by a common aim. That common aim is the retention or denial of freedom of action . . . The distributed operation is the basic building block of all operational planning and execution. . . .<sup>15</sup>

The notion uses the ideas of deep maneuver and distributed battles. The distributed operation is the essential element of operational art. All other tenets build upon this notion of distributed operation.

The second tenet of operational art is the distributed campaign. Dr. Schneider defines it as "the integration of several simultaneous and successive distributed operations in a campaign."<sup>16</sup> Distributed campaigns further extends the dimensions of space and time. Indeed, victory may entail not just one but several distributed operations, conducted over wide expanse, thus the need for distributed campaigns.

The third tenet is continuous logistics. This tenet says that logistics must be continuous throughout the campaign. When using distributed operations and distributed campaigns, logistics is important. The army can only move at a tempo and distance if the logistics support is continuous. If logistics fails to be continuous then the army loses its ability to conduct deep operations.

The fourth tenet is instantaneous command and control. Instantaneous command and control are the commander's immediate ability to direct his subordinate forces across great distances. This ability is important to a commander conducting distributed campaigns. When the enemy reacts unexpectedly the commander must be able to redirect the force. Indeed, distributed operations and campaigns may not even be possible without

the capacity for instantaneous command and control.

The fifth tenet is operationally durable formations. Continuous logistics and instantaneous communications contribute to operationally durable formations capable of conducting indefinitely a succession of distributed operations.<sup>17</sup> During the civil war, the field army became operationally durable because of continuous logistics and instantaneous communications afforded by railroads and the telegraph.

The sixth tenet is operational vision, defined as "the intuitive ability to render incomplete and ambiguous information into a meaningful impression of the true state of affairs in their theater of operations."<sup>18</sup> In distributed operations a commander must have a vision of the overall outcome. All subordinate commanders must understand this vision because it allows their actions, though distributed over time and space, to be unified in aim.

The seventh tenet is the distributed enemy, defined as an extended enemy or an enemy arrayed in depth. Distributed operations and campaigns are hardly necessary against an enemy that is concentrated in time and space. In fact, distributed operations against such an opponent may lead to piecemeal engagements.

The eight and final tenet is the distributed deployment, the nation's ability to sustain the production of resources needed in a protracted war. It involves a nation's ability to provide both personnel and materiel over the long duration it may take to impose national will over another nation.<sup>19</sup>

These tenets specify what operational art is about. As described, all the tenets revolve around the basic idea of actions over extended time and space--of distributed

operations. Indeed, distributed operations is the “basic building block of all operational planning and execution.” However, continuous logistics, instantaneous command and control, operationally durable formations, operational vision, and distributed deployment are what make distributed operations and campaigns possible. The distributed and operationally durable enemy is what makes distributed operations and campaigns necessary.

Clearly, Dr. Schneider’s theory of operational art is predicated upon conventional warfare between large armies. Dr. Schneider, in his tenets of operational art, excludes MOOTW. The definitions of distributed operations and distributed campaigns’ calls for deep maneuvers and distributed battles. In MOOTW battles do not always occur. The definition of distributed enemy, which calls for similarly designed opponent, does not fit in most MOOTW scenarios.

Certain conditions must exist in order for the tenets of operational art to develop. These conditions are based on technology and occur after the industrial revolution. Without these conditions operational art cannot exist. Dr. Schneider describes the conditions as follows:

First, weapons lethality must have advanced. . . to induce interbattlefield maneuver. . . . Second, logistics must advance to the state of supporting successive movement and sustainment. . . . Third, signals’ technology must have advanced sufficiently to sustain instantaneous communications. . . . Fourth, formations are operationally durable. . . able to conduct a succession of battles and deep maneuvers indefinitely. . . . Fifth, the command structure must possess operational vision. . . . Sixth, the enemy must be operationally minded; he must be trained, armed, equipped, structured and commanded in the same way as the friendly force. . . . Seventh, nations must have a distributed capacity to wage war. . . . Finally, distributed campaigns must be sustained strategically by a system of continuous mobilization.<sup>20</sup>

Understanding and recognizing the conditions that allow for operational art is critical in the analysis of operational art.

As with the tenets, the conditions of operational art seem to be exclusive to conventional warfare. In particular, the sixth condition that calls for an operationally minded enemy, similarly trained, equipped, armed, structured, and commanded, clearly excludes MOOTW. Since in MOOTW operations the enemy is not usually similar, then there can be no operational art. In the U.S. Army, preparation and training for conventional warfare remains the top priority. The operational art just described supports such a priority. Unfortunately, the most frequently executed military operation is MOOTW. This represents a clear gap between theory and current reality. Does doctrine bridge this gap?

#### Army Doctrine

Understanding the various definitions of operational art, as described in several doctrinal manuals, is critical. The transformation of theory into action occurs through doctrine. Doctrine outlines basic accepted concepts that apply theory to situations. Doctrine guides the force's action to attain a purpose. Understanding the connection of doctrine to theory is critical to understanding and answering the research question.

Field Manual (FM) 101-5-1, MCRP 5-2A, Operational Terms and Graphics, defines operational art as:

The employment of military forces to attain strategic and or operational objectives through design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design, and ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war.<sup>21</sup>



The definition of MOOTW is as follows:

Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instrument of national power and occur before, during, and after war.<sup>22</sup>

The Army and Joint community have accepted both definitions, and other doctrinal manuals follow these definitions of operational art and MOOTW.

FM 100-5 Operations, is the cornerstone doctrinal manual for Army operations. In its discussion of operational art, FM 100-5 is clearly focused on conventional warfare. "In its simplest expression, operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will fight."<sup>23</sup> With the emphasis on battles and fighting, it agrees with Dr. Schneider's definitions of distributed campaigns. The section goes on to say, "Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure."<sup>24</sup> This supports Dr. Schneider's view of operational art and war.

The field manual devotes an entire chapter to operations other than war (OOTW)<sup>25</sup>. In this chapter, there is not one reference to operational art being applied to this environment. It says, "Doctrine for war complements that for operation other than war. Though modified to fit different situations, some of the same principals apply to both environments."<sup>26</sup> This infers that the application is valid; but, it is vague.

FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, follows the same definition for operational art as stated earlier, but it expands the idea through Notions of Operational Art and Design: "center of gravity, decisive points, lines of operations,

culminating point, indirect approach, positional advantage, and strategic concentration of forces.”<sup>27</sup> These notions are most commonly referred to as the “Operational Concept”, and it is an idea derived from the higher commanders intent.<sup>28</sup> FM 100-5, describes operational art as translating “theater strategy and design into operational design that links and integrates the tactical battles and engagement that, when fought and won, achieves the strategic aim.”<sup>29</sup> This means the effects of operational art can be felt from the strategic level to the tactical level. Operational art bridges the gaps between these levels. It is an important idea.

The manual does take a different stand on MOOTW and operational art, “The operational-level commander prepares for a mission of unknown duration and anticipates changes in its nature and scope. To ensure success, he applies operational art executed within the framework of battle dynamics.”<sup>30</sup> This reference clearly makes the connection of operational art and MOOTW. This is in contrast with Dr. Schneider’s exclusion of operational art in MOOTW. This also shows a disconnect between doctrine and theory as taught in SAMS.

FM 100-7 devotes an entire chapter to OOTW. This chapter describes operations conducted, along the tenets of operational art, and within the conditions of operational art, with one exception--the manual recognizes that in OOTW operations the enemy is not similar. The chapter on OOTW describes situations where the enemy is everything, from terrorist bombers to drug lords. This manual recognizes that operational art theory applies to MOOTW.

FM 100-15, Corps Operations, is the primary doctrinal manual on corps

operations. It says that, "Corps usually links the operational and tactical levels of war. They may link operational and strategic levels of war as well."<sup>31</sup> This manual also recognizes the corps as the echelon that links the operational with the tactical level of war, but it never specifically addresses operational art. It does address many tenets of operational art but gives them more of a tactical perspective. An example is changing operational vision to battle command and instantaneous communications to Joint Battle Synchronization. These are only close associations but they do resemble Dr. Schneider's tenets. Operational art is vague in this doctrinal manual designed for corps whose task it is to link the operational and tactical levels of war. Moreover, the manual does not indicate how the corps can link operational art with MOOTW tactics.

#### MOOTW Doctrine

Peace operations "encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace."<sup>32</sup> These operations are the most common military missions conducted today; therefore, understanding how Army and Joint communities depict operational art in doctrine on peace operations is important.

FM 100-23, Peace Operations, is the keystone manual on peace operations. It begins by stressing the importance of the operations:

The strategic context of peace operations must be communicated and understood by all involved in the operation. Soldiers must understand that they can encounter situations where the decisions they make at the tactical level have immediate strategic and political implications. In addition to the overall strategic and political context of the operation, soldiers should be aware of the area's history, economy, culture, and any other significant factors. Failure to fully understand the mission and operational environment can quickly lead to incidents and misunderstandings that will reduce the legitimacy and consent and result in actions that are inconsistent with the over all political objective.<sup>33</sup>

In these operations the links from strategic to operational to tactical levels are not always vertical. In this environment operational art would be important in making those links; however, this manual never addresses operational art. It does address a process that uses pieces of operational art, such as campaign planning and battle command.<sup>34</sup> There is some connection to operational art; but again it is vague. This is also true in other doctrinal manuals such as FM 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet(AFP) 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, and FM 7-98, Operations In a Low-Intensity Conflict.

FM 7-98 lists Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) into four operational categories: support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency operations.<sup>35</sup> It describes the categories and explains how units deploy in MOOTW situations, but it does not describe the planning and conduct of operations in a way that would resemble operational art, or any other theory. The manual is a collection of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for units operating in LIC.

Army doctrine is clear and constant on the definitions and purpose of operational art as it applies to conventional warfare. The doctrine is vague on the relationship between operational art and MOOTW. The doctrine written for MOOTW does not specifically address the topic. When the doctrine relates MOOTW to operational art, it does so vaguely and inconsistently, from manual to manual.

### Joint Doctrine

Most modern combat or MOOTW operations will be conducted in a Joint environment. Joint doctrine enables the services to work together within a common framework. Joint doctrine provides a common and agreed upon view of how operations are to be conducted.

Joint Publication(JP) 3-0 Operations, discusses operational art in detail. It states that, "Operational art requires broad vision. . . Joint operational art focuses on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces."<sup>36</sup> Commanders vision is a critical aspect of Joint planning. Understanding the commanders intent is an important step in the formulation of all subordinate plans. General Colin Powell as former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff said:

Planning for employment of joints teams begins with articulating and understanding the purpose of the operation and the commander's intent (the commander's vision of how the operation will be conducted). Joint Force Commanders receive direction and guidance from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the responsible CINC. If a Joint Force Commander is subordinate to a CINC, the CINC refines the direction and guidance for the Joint Force Commander charged with the campaign or operation. The responsible Joint Force Commander then translates this guidance into clearly defined, attainable, and measurable objectives. The statement of what constitutes military success becomes the target at which full dimensional operations are directed.<sup>37</sup>

Aside from emphasizing commander's vision, JP 3-0 also, details what Joint operational art is by defining the fundamental elements of operational art.<sup>38</sup> However, in the detailed descriptions of the fundamentals of Joint Operational Art, the language is broad though not exclusive of MOOTW. In most descriptions, the word "operation" substitutes for

“battle and engagements.” But, in several instances when JP 3-0 mentions war, “other than war” situations follow. This allows readers to make the connection between MOOTW and operational art.

In JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, there are no direct references to operational art. The document does stress the importance of the connection between political and military objectives. The document does reference JP 3-0 as providing basic ideas and principles to guide the services in planning for MOOTW.


The Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations, describes planning in a MOOTW environment. The handbook specifically addresses using current service doctrine and making it fit to peacekeeping operations. This documents recommends that during mission analysis the term “parties to the dispute” can be substituted for “enemy” in METT-T.<sup>39</sup> The handbook stresses that operations in MOOTW are different and the commander must consider many factors not seen in conventional warfare such as long term stability, transition, mission creep, and defining success.<sup>40</sup> While this handbook does not specifically address operational art, it makes a clear connection between operational art and MOOTW in the way it describes operational planning.

### Summary

Figure 2 illustrates the link between operational art theory and doctrine. Doctrine results from the examination of theory to establish ways to deal with actual situations. In this case, the result of this process are conceptual tools found in the doctrinal manuals previously examined. These tools represent a distillation of theory into usable instruments

for planners. But the question remains to be the applicability of these doctrinal tools to MOOTW. After all, conventional warfare and MOOTW operations are different; they each have different environmental concerns and special planning considerations.

Figure 2--Operational Art, Doctrine, and MOOTW Missions



Joint doctrine and Army doctrine are different in their approach to the application of operational art to MOOTW environments. Figure 2 illustrates this chapter's conclusion that joint doctrine does apply operational art considerations to MOOTW environments.

Joint doctrine does distill theory to a doctrine that applies to both conventional operations and to MOOTW. In contrast, Army doctrine is vague about operational art's application to MOOTW. Army doctrine does not connect theory to doctrine as strongly as Joint doctrine does. Thus, it is questionable whether planners and operators could have employed operational art, as outlined in Army FMs, to MOOTW operations such as those listed in the third column of Figure 2.

Finally, the list of MOOTW operations in Figure 2 is not comprehensive but representative of the many the U.S. military has executed since 1989. This list also illustrates the uniqueness and variety of executed operations-- from noncombatant evacuation operations to peace enforcement. Chapter 3 examines two of the MOOTW operations listed: Somalia, 1992, and Haiti, 1994. These examples were selected because of the major differences in the operational outcomes despite the similarities of the operational environments.



## CHAPTER III.

### HISTORICAL REVIEW

This chapter examines two examples of MOOTW. The operations in Somalia and Haiti have been selected because they are recent examples of MOOTW; this chapter examines each operation differently because each achieved different degrees of success. Critics view the Somalia operation as one of limited success and many problem areas. These problem areas will constitute the discussion on Somalia. Examining the major problems with the Somalia operation enables the determination of ways to prevent the problems, and of means, in terms of Joint and Army doctrinal tools, to achieve positive results.

Most analyst view the operation in Haiti as successful, and the examination will focus on the positive aspects of the operation. The writer will identify the positive results and examine them using Army and Joint doctrinal tools. The result of this examination allows for the determination of what effects theory and doctrine have on MOOTW operations.

#### Somalia

In December 1992, the UN sent a peacekeeping force, led by 2,000 United States Marines to restore order, and international agencies attempted to distribute food and humanitarian aid. U.S. forces continued to build from 1992 to 1993. Yet, over the next two years factional fighting and starvation resulted in thousands of Somali deaths. In mid 1994, the last of the U.S. forces left Somalia, having failed in the task of restoring order. The international aid agencies began leaving, and the warring factions increased fighting.

The result of the operation was inconclusive. The forces distributed some food to alleviate the famine, but the country remains without a government.

This was a joint and combined operation in which the planners envisioned four operational phases: Phase I involved the deployment of forces to Somalia to secure the ports and airfields in Mogadishu and Baledogle; Phase II saw the force expand operations and provide security of humanitarian relief distribution sites; Phase III was when the ground forces expanded security operation into outlying areas; and Phase IV was the transition of theater functions and responsibilities to the UN.<sup>41</sup>

In this operation three areas of concern affected mission success: unclear intelligence about the belligerents and the environment, unclear end states and exit strategies, and poor deployment of units and their equipment. These three areas effected planning and execution, both prior to and after deployment.

Unclear intelligence stemmed from the strategic and operational intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). This was a two-fold problem. First, there was ineffective parallel planning between the strategic and the operational intelligence levels. "Early parallel planning would also allow units to access the strategic IPB that is conducted early in the operation. Currently, strategic level planning is accomplished with strategic IPB that does not filter through the various headquarters in a timely manner."<sup>42</sup> Secondly, the IPB process did not properly adapt to the non conventional environment. "Although the basic principles of the IPB process were employed fully, application of traditional war fighting considerations failed to capture the unique character of the operation in time to impact planning, force design, and time-phased force deployment data

(TPFDD) development.”<sup>43</sup> These two problems with IPB had a negative impact throughout planning and operations.

The IPB process should provide the commanders key information critical to decision making during the planning process and during the operation. There was not any historical data on the enemy forces in Somalia, and it had to be developed while units were already deployed.<sup>44</sup> This lack of planning data on the enemy affected the deployment flow. Since commanders were not sure what to prepare for, they wanted to prepare for everything. This resulted in the deployment of unneeded equipment--18% of the deployed equipment redeployed without ever offloading.<sup>45</sup> Key intelligence collection systems and material handling systems deployed late, evidence that planners did not prioritize units properly in the flow.<sup>46</sup>

The lack of proper enemy intelligence caused the planners to misjudge the clans’ intent during the initial entry operations. The Marine Forces (MARFOR) conducted an amphibious assault to secure the sea and air ports of Mogadishu, only to be met by the international news media and the local population.<sup>47</sup> Once the ground situation became clear, units received changes of mission, but without benefits of the time to adequately plan. For example, just prior to loading the aircraft at Griffiss Air Force Base, New York, TF 3-14 received a mission change to secure an airfield 300 miles from their original objective.<sup>48</sup> Not surprisingly, units arrived poorly prepared to conduct operations in their new areas of operations.

Linking together the strategic, operational, and tactical IPB efforts could have avoided one of the problems with the IPB. The planners could have avoided this problem

through more effective parallel planning prior to deployment. The first tactical units deployed into the area of operations should receive relevant intelligence in time to plan and execute initial missions. Availability of national assets for intelligence gathering to the tactical planners of early deploying units would ensure timely mission planning and execution.

The other major problem with IPB was improper consideration of the operational environment, "... applying the traditional warfighter considerations to Somalia failed to capture the unique character of the operation . . ."<sup>49</sup> A more detailed IPB, one focused on demographics, could have avoided this problem. This would better enable the planners to support the commander's decision process.

The planners could have applied several Army doctrinal tools such as centers of gravity, decisive points and indirect approach to resolve the intelligence problems. If the intelligence effort had focused on identifying "enemy" centers of gravity, the planners would have known better what forces to deploy, where, and with what equipment to accomplish the task. It is possible that the true enemy was instability and hunger, and that there was not a true conventional enemy. If relief of hunger and maintaining stability had been the focus, as it later was, units could have quickly begun to attack that center of gravity. Conversely, by identifying the friendly centers of gravity, the planners would know what units, where, and with what, are needed to protect the force. If hunger and stability were the enemy centers of gravity then the planners could view food and security forces as the friendly centers of gravity. The intelligence could have assisted in developing decisive points, which would provide the key to defeating or protecting the centers of

gravity. Identification of the center of gravity and the decisive points, would allow the planners to determine the best way to approach the problem, the lines of operation if you will. This is usually the indirect approach, which attacks the center of gravity by exploiting weakness and protecting friendly vulnerabilities. This approach to the intelligence problem could have unified the planning effort and avoided some of the problems.

Several Joint doctrinal tools such as center of gravity, direct vs. indirect approach, decisive points, anticipation, and leverage were also available. The two areas not already discussed are anticipation and leverage. Anticipation leads to the ability to apply leverage. If intelligence had been more focused on anticipating the nature of "enemy" activities, commanders and the planners would have been able to leverage U.S. technological, training, and resource edge to exploit the weakness of any belligerent forces.

The problem associated with unclear end states have become the legacy of the operations in Somalia. For operation Restore Hope, "The end state desired is to create an environment in which the UN and NGOs can assume full responsibility for the security and operations of the Somalia humanitarian relief efforts."<sup>50</sup> The first problem was in understanding and defining what the required conditions were to reach end state.

The end state desired is to create an environment [Does this mean stop the fighting and secure central and southern Somalia, or does it imply establishing institutions (police, judicial, schools, local governments) and infrastructure (roads, power, water, etc.)?] in which the UN and NGOs can assume full responsibility [What is the U.S. role after full assumption--residual force? Must UN and all NGOs agree on responsibilities? Without a host nation, who is the honest broker? Is this event driven or time dependent? Must it include all humanitarian relief sectors (HRS) or most?] for the security and operations of the Somalian humanitarian relief efforts." [Must security be permanent prior to hand off and does it include disarming clans? Must clans agree to a permanent cease fire? Do operations include more than the initial set of relief sites or does it include the nation-assistance activities initiated by the U.S., UN, and NGOs?].<sup>51</sup>

Units compounded the difficulty with understanding by developing their own end states, and the conditions needed to accomplish these end states.

The second problem was that the commander and staff did not communicate the "official" end state down to all subordinate units, "... clear end states and conditions required to meet these end states were never established by higher headquarters."<sup>52</sup> In Somalia the commander's vision was never connected to the end states for the operation. The higher level commanders established operational vision but all subordinates did not understand it, and at each level of command the interpretation of the mission caused a variety of end state definitions.

The establishment of end states for participation of military forces and the condition that must exist to support those end states are key ingredients to any operation. Going into this operation and throughout the mission the one question that always needed to be answered was; "what are the military conditions that must exist in each HRS and for each mission in order to achieve the desired end states?" The end state established for military operations was the transition of operations to peacekeeping or coalition forces. While at the highest levels of command this may be an acceptable end state, how the ARFOR was expected to support this end state was not at all clear. In order to clarify end states, the ARFOR developed their own end states and conditions that must be achieved within each HRS to claim victory.<sup>53</sup>

The unclear end state also had a crippling effect on the ground efforts by causing problems with task identification and assignment. The phenomenon known as "mission creep" became a popular phrase associated with Somalia. Mission creep happened because of the lack of a governmental infrastructure, difficulty in coordination with relief agencies, difficulty with political negotiation, growing nation-assistance functions, competing priorities, external pressures, and various interpretations of security missions.<sup>54</sup>

If the commander had established the end states mission creep could have been avoided. "Mission creep, oddly enough, is one of the dynamics which end state should prevent."<sup>55</sup> Clear end states would have allowed the planners to focus units on specific objectives, and achieving those objectives would have accomplished the mission.

Contributing to this problem of unclear end state is the absence of an overarching vision to guide the military effort. The National Command Authority along with the CINC must determine specifically what the situation should look like at the end of the operation. This end state should include all the elements of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. "Military commanders cannot expect a failed state to become inherently peaceful and stable and their effort to be worthwhile in the long run without the work of developmental and civil affairs experts."<sup>56</sup> In this operation the State Department should have developed a plan to assist in establishing a recognized government, to provide economic aid and engender economic development, and to assist in developing informational networks needed by a fledgling government to unite the people of Somalia. "No military mission statement or operational plan can ever substitute for comprehensive strategy for a humanitarian intervention because it would not necessarily include humanitarian relief, developmental interventions, political negotiations, and diplomatic initiatives."<sup>57</sup> If the State Department plan drove the military plan, the outcome in Somalia would have persisted long after the last units departed.

The commander must ensure that his intent is clear and understood, and that it provides the military conditions to support the end state. There must be a clear connection between the strategic, operational, and tactical purposes of the operation.

“There must be a common understanding among the partners of a coalition regarding its military and political goals and objectives, and the measures taken to attain the goals.”<sup>58</sup>

Once established, all subordinate leaders must understand the commander’s intent.

The Army doctrinal tools available to avoid problems with end state is operational concept, which includes center of gravity, decisive points, and lines of operation. Once again the planners must tie this end state to the other elements of national power. It may be that the military instrument is not the lead force in the operation, but only an enabling force. In Somalia the diplomatic portion of DIME should have been the dominant force, and the planners should have closely tied the military end state to the diplomatic end state. The operational concept is the commander’s idea of how to accomplish higher commander’s intent. The commander forms operational concept through mission analysis, experience, and judgement. The commander’s applies his knowledge of the situation, combined with the higher commanders intent to determine enemy and friendly centers of gravity, decisive points, and lines of operation. Center of gravity allows the commander to analyze the enemy and friendly situation so that he can determine decisive points. The determination of decisive points allows the commander to decide what has to be done and where the action needs to take place. The line of operation connects the forces with their operating bases, allowing combat forces to strike the enemy. These three factors allow the commander to accomplish the conditions of the operational concept. If the subordinate staff planners match the operational concept with the higher commander’s concept, the mission will accomplish the desired end state.

In this operation operational concept, center of gravity, and decisive point were



tied to conventional “enemy forces” and not to MOOTW “enemy forces.” The enemy in Somalia was hunger and chaos. “. . . food had become a source of instability in that the merchants were encouraging the looting of food convoys and NGO warehouses to supply their own markets.”<sup>59</sup> If the commander had focused on these aspects and not just on the belligerents, and tied his operations to the other elements of DIME, the out come may have been more lasting.

The Joint doctrinal tool, termination, could have assisted in the problems mentioned with end state. The NCA determines termination of the operation. The termination criteria is closely tied to the end state, and it aids in defining the end state. If we expect the results of the operation to endure, the termination must include factors that ensure that the end state endures. The planners must tie the termination factors to the other factors of national power. In Somalia, the military forces could only reach stability if other elements of national power, such as diplomatic and economic, were effective. One aid worker said, “This is a political problem with a military solution.”<sup>60</sup> There was not an economic or diplomatic plan which would allow the country to reestablish trade and unite. “Given that so much of the economy revolved around the plunder of food aid, the failure to develop a plan to restore the economy to normal was a grievous errors and emblematic of the mission’s failure to address anything beyond exigencies.”<sup>61</sup> The plan was only militarily oriented and its purpose was to stop the fighting, allow the starving to be fed, and return the country to the status quo.

The final problem area is force projection, specifically with the stages of predeployment, deployment, and entry operations. The problems seen in these three

stages impacted on the mission early.

During the predeployment stage, planning and input to the Time-Phased Deployment List (TPFDL) was conducted by three different headquarters: XVIII Corps, ARCENT, and ARFOR (10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division). The planners were producing the TPFDL before the task organization was completed and the ARFOR commander had no direct access to the TPFDL.<sup>62</sup> This limited the ARFOR commander's ability to develop a plan since he could not control the sequence of units deploying into Somalia. The planning time line for the ARFOR was very short, and critical deployment decisions had to be made early.

. . . Operation Restore Hope began on 30 November 1993, with notification. . . On 3 December 1993 the Division was designated the headquarters for all Army Forces (ARFOR). . . The ARFOR deployment began on 7 December (D-2) with the departure of the first seven trains for the port of Bayonne. On 9 December (D-Day) the first Marines landed in Mogadishu. On D+1 the JTF headquarters decided that the first ARFOR units needed to arrive at Baledogle on D+3, seven days earlier than initially planned.<sup>63</sup>

The Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL), identified 15 critical planning days that were reduced to three days planning before the deployment began.<sup>64</sup> This time constraint inhibited the commander's ability to develop a plan for the operation, and caused him to develop only a plan to support the deployment.

During the deployment phase, force projection was limited by the number of available aircraft and the number and type of airfields in Somalia. Initial planning by the ARFOR centered around the planning factor of 20 C141 equivalent per day, subsequently reduced to 10 C141 aircraft per day after the trains had left Ft. Drum, New York.<sup>65</sup> The lack of airfields also compounded the problem with airflow. Mogadishu airport was

capable of handling no more than two aircraft at a time.<sup>66</sup> The lack of aircraft and airports delayed the ground mission and prevented ground units from quickly moving into sectors.

The Army's CONUS based forces depend on strategic assets, such as pre-positioned ships, in order to deploy. The planners earmarked three pre-positioned ships to support the operation, but all three ships were unable to off-load cargo in Mogadishu, and two returned to Diego Garcia without ever unloading their cargo.<sup>67</sup> The equipment that was not off-loaded was critical, especially the corps surgical hospital (CSH), which had to be deployed from the U.S.<sup>68</sup> The problems with the pre-positioned ship impacted the tempo of ground operations and the deployment.

Introducing new aircraft and better planning procedures for deploying by air could have fixed the force projection problems with aircraft. The C-17 aircraft would have yielded a 41% improvement rate in air usage.<sup>69</sup> Air planners need to receive quick input from the deploying commander on priorities of equipment and personnel. The deploying commander needs to have access to the TPFDD so that the deployment plan can support the theater plan.

The Army doctrinal tools available to assist in the force projection problem are lines of operation and culmination. In terms of Joint doctrine, the tools available are operational reach and culmination. Having an understanding of the lines of operation, and analyzing the distances involved will allow the planners to understand the importance of deploying the force properly. Detailed analysis of the Somalia sea and airports would point out the problems. This should include “. . . timely intelligence on the port and its characteristics. Current, well-informed assessments of its operational capacity. . .”<sup>70</sup>.

Adjusting the lines of operation would overcome the problems of accounting for the infrastructure shortcomings. Understanding the impact of culmination on the forces is critical. This would force the planners to better prioritize the equipment, and the way they deployed it into Somalia. The use of sealift is critical to staving off culmination, "... almost 95 percent of a deployment's total requirements that come by seas offer the best opportunity to build a base which will sustain peace operations for as long as the mission requires."<sup>71</sup> This analysis gives the theater commander the operational reach and approach needed to accomplish the mission.




Figure 3-Problems, Solutions, Tools-Somalia

Figure 3 summarizes the discussion on Somalia. This figure shows the possible solutions, and the doctrinal tools available to solve the problems. The problems identified are very complex and not easily solved; but, the discussion illustrates that the use of operational art embodied in available doctrinal tools can assist the planner in anticipating and perhaps avoiding potential problem.

### Haiti

Operation Uphold Democracy began on September 19, 1994, with U.S. Army forces conducting a permissive air movement onto the Port-Au-Prince International Airport. The purpose of the operation was to ensure the Haitian armed forces and police complied with the Carter-Cedras accords. These accords called for the protection of U.S. citizens and interests, and designated Haitians and third country nationals. It also asked for return to civil order, the reorganization of the Haitian armed forces, and the transition to a democratic government.<sup>72</sup> The transition to democratic government was complete on 15 October 1994 with the return of President Jean Bertrand Aristide to Haiti.

Planning was a key area of success in the operation. Flexibility characterized the planning for this operation, a clearly defined end state, and integration of forces. The plan had to be flexible because the entry conditions were unknown. Peace negotiations were ongoing and the possibility existed that the forces would conduct either a permissive or a nonpermissive entry. Planners developed two major operational plans for the contingency operation in Haiti. One plan, OPLAN 2370, was a forced-entry into a nonpermissive environment. The other plan, OPLAN 2380, was a permissive-entry option.<sup>73</sup> Due to a last-minute agreement the military forces executed the permissive-entry

option, even as the assault force was poised in the air ready to execute the force-entry option.

The Carter-Cedras accords defined the end state for the operation, which called for establishing a safe and secure environment, for the return of President Aristide, and for a transition of the mission to UN control.<sup>74</sup> This end state was clear and disseminated to the subordinate commanders. Defining a safe and secure environment became a challenge, "Security is defined as the physical security environment, the part with which we were mainly concerned. Stability is defined as the overall stability of the government and the country, not necessarily from a security standpoint, but a political and economic standpoint."<sup>75</sup> This definition was clear in establishing that the military would not act alone, but in concert with other elements of national power in achieving end state. As a result, U.S. government officials assisted in building economic, police, and judicial institutions.<sup>76</sup> The military forces were thus able to establish the secure environment needed to achieve the end state.

The plan integrated forces well for the operation, and used the forces' capabilities in unique ways. Four examples of successful integration were the employment of Naval assets, the Special Operations Forces (SOF), Military Police (MP), and combat service support (CSS). The first example was the use of aircraft carriers as force projection platforms. The aircraft carriers America and Eisenhower were command and control platforms and pickup zones (PZs) for conducting air assault operations.<sup>77</sup> This provided the Army a safe and secure command and control center which was operational prior to the deployment.

The planners integrated SOF and MPs into the plan. It was determined that the rural areas had a large concentration of possible belligerents, and the SOF were tasked to move into those areas to conduct stability and security operations.<sup>78</sup> This use of SOF and their unique capabilities allowed the commander to concentrate conventional ground forces in highly populated areas. The MPs conducted a variety of tasks in the operation. Besides their doctrinal tasks they acted as liaison officer/negotiator between the JTF commander and the Chief of Police for Port-au-Prince.<sup>79</sup>

The CSS units were integrated early in the planning process. The 46<sup>th</sup> Corps Support Group (CSG) (Airborne), participated in two major planning exercises in preparation for the operation.<sup>80</sup> This early integration allowed them to develop the framework for synchronizing the logistics plan.

The Army doctrinal tools used in planning were operational concept, center of gravity, and decisive points. The effectiveness of operational concept was due to the clear end state, defined goals, and termination strategy. Examining the center of gravity developed the operational concept. In the permissive environment, the biggest threat to stability and security were crime and riots, which would occur in areas with the largest populations. The heavily populated areas, the cities of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien were determined to be the centers of gravity.<sup>81</sup> By examining the two cities as the centers of gravity, the commander was able to develop a plan and array forces there. The commander deployed the majority of the combat and security forces in these cities, and was successful in maintaining order.

The use of decisive points enabled the commander to identify specifically the areas

within the center of gravity in which the security forces would have the most impact. This involved patrolling areas where crime was rampant and gang activity high. It also involved occupying key areas such as the airport and market places.

Arranging operations and timing and tempo, both Joint doctrinal tools, occurred when units deployed into Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien, and the rural areas, simultaneously. The overwhelming forces kept any belligerents from disrupting the operations and it quickly set the tone for the operation. The supporters quickly moved the CSS assets ashore which allowed the maneuver forces to continue operations after the initial landings.

The next key area of success was the deployment of forces into the theater. The two OPLANS differed in their entry option but the objective of the deployment was constant--to establish a stable and secure environment, and to allow the return of President Aristide. This called for the immediate seizures of the centers of gravity. The 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne or the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division was to arrive at Port-au-Prince, the Marine Air Ground Force was to arrive at Cap Hatien, and the SOF was to deploy into the rural areas.<sup>82</sup> This rapid deployment would swiftly secure the decisive points and prevent belligerents from disrupting operations.

During Operation Uphold Democracy, CONUS-based forces deployed directly into theater, and were employed immediately upon arrival. This is particularly remarkable as the envisioned TPFDD for the operation was modified at the last minute to support a "melded" employment of forces from both JTFs 180 and 190. This resulted in a significant flow of combat and combat support personnel early on, with many of the personnel necessary for sustainment and life support not arriving until the bulk of forces had closed within the Joint Operating Area (JOA).<sup>83</sup>

The deployment was hard to execute because of the last minute change to the permissive



plan; but, it worked due to planning and to detailed deployment rehearsals.

Mass and maneuver characterized the deployment phase. The planners developed all of the OPLANS to put overwhelming force on the ground quickly to seize the centers of gravity. Both plans and the variations developed called for putting a division equivalent of combat forces into Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien, and the rural areas. These forces were more than sufficient to stop any criminal or governmental forces that wanted to interfere with the landings. Strategic maneuver was the key to the successful deployment phase.

Strategic maneuver was, in itself, the essence of the deployment phase and was executed like clockwork by both sea and air. . . .the force was extremely well developed in the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and had been well practiced by U.S. military forces. . . .Thus, while there were some innovative refinements such as CINC ACOM's use of the carriers as a base fro his adaptive joint force packages, this was merely an incremental stressing of the strategic maneuver system.<sup>84</sup>

Mass and maneuver were critical principles executed correctly in the deployment phase.

The Army doctrinal tools used were operational concept and lines of operation. Once again the deployment demonstrated the importance of the operational concept. The commander identified the center of gravity and deployed his forces at decisive points. The fact that the planners developed all the OPLANS to support the operational concept demonstrates how important it was to the operation. All the subordinate leaders understood the operational concept and they correctly nested their plans to the higher commanders vision. The lines of operation were critical to developing the operational concept. The commander understood the importance of connecting his forces with the bases of operation. This was seen by the extensive use of ships to support the operation

and the large logistical support base quickly established on shore. At no time during this operation were the ground units on the verge of culmination.

The final key area of success was the execution of the operation. Once the units arrived on the island they immediately began conducting operations. The ground commanders never lost site of their objective, to establish a safe and secure environment and to allow the return of President Aristide. This included initiating a weapons confiscation policy and a weapons buy back program, aimed at decreasing the weapons availability in Haiti.<sup>85</sup> The JTF units also began raids against weapons cache sites that lasted from 1 October to 20 October, along with seizing weapons and arresting personnel suspected of plotting violent acts against the return of President Aristide.<sup>86</sup> These actions, along with constant patrolling of the streets and rural areas, allowed the return of President Aristide on 15 October 1994.

Professionalism, force protection, and restraint characterized the execution phase. The professionalism of the U.S. forces during this operation was critical. The forces were in a difficult position early in the operation when the belligerent intent was not clear. The actions of every soldier were important in maintaining the legitimacy of the operation.

Force protection is an issue in every MOOTW operation. The military had not forgotten the lessons learned in Somalia when the deaths of 18 Rangers ended the operation. The forces took precautions such as limiting contact with Haitian nationals, securing locations of assembly area, wearing flak vest, and doing limited patrols at night.<sup>87</sup> These actions seemed excessive to some but it did limit the number of U.S. and Haitian casualties due to conflict.

Restraint in the use of force is a principle of MOOTW executed well in Haiti. The

basic external control measure used was the rules of engagement (ROE). There were three different ROE cards developed for use during hostilities, during transition to civil-military operations, and during aviation operations.<sup>88</sup> The Staff Judge Advocate developed the ROE with the intent of clearly defining flexible responses in varying confrontational situations. The forces accomplished internal control through the training and leadership. Restraint was critical in maintaining order and the legitimacy of the JTF.

The Army doctrinal tools used effectively in the execution phase were positional advantage and lines of operation. The key to maintaining a secure and stable environment was being at the right place at the right time. The forces accomplish this by maintaining positional advantage and lines of operation. The overwhelming presence of troops in areas where hostilities were most likely to occur prevented organized resistance to the mission. This was seen with the simultaneous deployment of troops to the rural areas by the SOF, the Marines in Cap Hatien, and the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division in Port-au-Prince.<sup>89</sup> Lines of operation allowed the U.S. forces to maintain pressure on possible belligerent forces. The large buildup of support units and the constant resupply from ships ensured that the lines of operation would support the operations. Units were able to maintain their presence in critical locations all over the island and conduct raids in order to secure stability.

The Joint doctrinal tools observed were synergy and forces and function. During the execution phase integrating and synchronizing the actions of the Joint forces effectively kept hostile forces from disrupting stability. The combination of the weapons buy back programs, weapons seizure, and raids eventually defeated any organized hostile activities of any belligerents. The resulting peace that ensued after the success of the raids,

seizures, and buy backs, allowed the legislature to open on 28 September 1994, and the mayor to Port-au-Prince to return to office.<sup>90</sup> The planners utilized forces and functions effectively with the combination of infantry, civil affairs, military police, SOF, and PSYOP teams. "Infantry, MP and tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs) successfully induced elements of the Revolutionary Front fro the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) and attaches to surrender and relinquish their weapons with scarcely and resort to violence."<sup>91</sup> These organizations task-organized to defeat any elements opposed to the secure and stable environment.




Figure 4-Key Results, Application, Tools Used-Haiti

Figure 4 summarizes the analysis of the operation in Somalia. This figure illustrates how the positive results occurred due to the application of doctrinal aspects of Army and Joint operational art. The forces did not accomplish this operation without mistakes, but the overall results were positive. They accomplished the military end state of the operation, and they conducted the operation with minimal loss of U.S. or Haitian lives. It is evident that the application of doctrinally prescribed operational tools in the key phases of MOOTW can result in certain traits that could eventually spell the success of the entire operation.

## CHAPTER IV

### CONCLUSIONS

This monograph examines Dr. Schneider's theory on operational art, Army and Joint doctrine on operational art and MOOTW, and two recent MOOTW operations. The intent was to determine continuity and support as one goes from theory, to doctrine, to practice. The monograph arrives at the following conclusions: that operational art theory is consistent with operational art doctrine for the most part; that doctrine, especially Joint doctrine, supports the planning and execution of MOOTW with tools derived from operational art doctrine; and that operational art can be applied in the planning and execution of MOOTW.

In MOOTW operations planning is neither flawed nor lacking connection with respect to operational art. While it is true that the problems associated with the Somalia operation can be traced to planning, these problems resulted from misapplication of, rather than absent or flawed, planning doctrine. Somalia represents what can happen when doctrinal planning tools are not used or are used improperly. Figure 3 shows how the major problems could have been avoided through proper application of operational planning tools.

On the other hand, Haiti is an example of successful application of current doctrine. Most of the mistakes made in Somalia were not repeated in Haiti. The results of Somalia caused the military to reexamine how MOOTW operations should be conducted. The successes of this reexamination were seen in the Haiti operation. Figure 4 illustrates how the application of doctrinal tools in planning enabled mission success.

Theory is somewhat incomplete, but it does generally support operational art as

described in doctrine. Dr. Schneider's basic definition of operational art is, "the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organization of campaigns and major operations."<sup>92</sup> The doctrinal definition of operational art includes everything that Dr. Schneider says, and includes "... the joint forces commander's strategy into operational design, and ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war."<sup>93</sup> Although Dr. Schneider intended his theory to apply to full war, doctrine extends theory to include MOOTW. After all, MOOTW operations do attain strategic goals, and are designed in terms of campaigns and major operations. Both historical examples examined used major campaigns to achieve strategic goals.

Not only are the theoretical and doctrinal definitions of operational art similar, they also agree in most aspects of Dr. Schneider's tenets of operational art. Both theory and doctrine revolve around the central idea of distributed operations and distributed campaigns. Furthermore, the historical case studies illustrate the applicability of most of these theoretical concepts in the planning and execution of MOOTW. Clearly, operational art, both in theory and by doctrine, applies to MOOTW.

There is one basic disagreement between Dr. Schneider's theory and doctrine--the idea of a distributed enemy that "is similarly trained, equipped, structured, and commanded as the friendly force."<sup>94</sup> This idea is incompatible with MOOTW operations. In Haiti and Somalia, or other third world countries, the national forces are in no way similar to U.S. forces. In MOOTW operations the enemy is rarely similar. In fact, as in the initial stages of the Somalia operations and throughout the entire Haiti operation, "potential opponents" rather than "enemy" would be the more appropriate labels to use in some MOOTW situations. But this inconsistency hardly warrants a separate operational

art theory for MOOTW. New operational art theory is not needed.

The current theory is acceptable, but the connection between the theory and MOOTW doctrine should be more solid to dispel any doubt that the notion of operational art applies to all army missions, along the entire spectrum of conflict. Army doctrine is vague about the applicability of operational art to MOOTW. Only one Field Manual, FM 100-7, specifically mentions operational art.<sup>95</sup> The MOOTW specific manuals do not address operational art. Yet, despite the vagueness of MOOTW operational art doctrine, both historical examples demonstrate that doctrine provides effective operational tools in the planning and execution of MOOTW. This shows that, even though MOOTW and operational art may not be doctrinally linked in every manual, the use of operational art in MOOTW does occur and is indispensable.

Joint doctrine is written differently. It is written with constant references to operational art in MOOTW. Joint doctrine is also written so that combat operations and battles are not the dominant theme--Joint doctrine stresses that the principles of operational art in the Joint world have application to all Joint missions. Army doctrine needs to be written similar to Joint doctrine so that soldiers and leaders can clearly associate operational art to MOOTW. MOOTW operations are difficult to execute, but the unerring application of doctrinal principles in the planning process can avoid many problems.

Operational art can be applied to MOOTW as clearly demonstrated in the review of two historical examples. This is true because the tenets of operational art form the basis of current doctrine, and current doctrine supports MOOTW with tools derived from operational art. So, despite the protestations of purists like Dr. Schneider, SAMS must



lead the way in instituting change, both in Army doctrine and the AMSP curriculum, so there can be no doubt among Army planners and leaders that operational art, not only applies to MOOTW, but is in fact essential to the success of MOOTW.

## NOTES

1. L. D. Holder, COL U.S. Army, "Educating and Training for Theater Warfare," *Military Review* (Sep., 1990), 85.

2. Richard M. Swain, PH.D., *Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1996), 13.

3. MOOTW will be used because it is recognized and accepted Joint term.

4. James J. Schneider, PH.D., *Vulcans Anvil: The American Civil war and the Emergence of Operational Art*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1991), 38.

5. Ibid. 64.

6. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5-1, Marine Corps Reference Publication, (MCRP) 5-2A, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, (Department of the Army, United States Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 30 Sep., 1997), 1-100.

7. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, (Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., June 1993), 6-7.

8. Schneider, *Vulcans Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art*, 6.

9. Ibid. 38-40.

10. Ibid. 65-67.

11. Russell F. Weigley, *The Age of Battles*, (Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis), 1991, 167.

12. Schneider, *The Theory of Operational Art*, 14.

13. Ibid, 15.

14. Schneider, *Vulcans Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art*, p. 30.

15. Ibid. 38.

16. Ibid. 42.

17. Ibid. 55.

18. Ibid. 58.

19. Ibid. 63.

20. Ibid. 65-66.

21. FM 101-5-1, MCRP, 5-2A, 1-114.

22. Ibid. 1-100-1-101.

23. FM 100-5, 6-2.

24. Ibid. 6-3 and 13-0. 1) Centers of gravity are the essence of operational art and are concentrating friendly, military forces and resources against the enemy's main sources of strength in a way that provides the JFC with the strategic and operational advantage and the initiative, 2) Decisive points are the keys to defeating or protecting the center of gravity, 3) Lines of operation define the direction of a force in relation to the enemy, it connects the force with its base of operations-from that it receives reinforcements and resupply and its forward units where it operates against the enemy, 4) Culminating point is the point in time and space at which the offensive combat power no longer sufficiently exceeds that of the defender to allow continuation of the offense, 5) Indirect approach is a scheme that attacks the enemy center of gravity from unexpected directions or at unexpected times, it seeks enemy vulnerabilities and avoids enemy strengths, 6) Positional advantage and strategic concentration of forces, attaining this advantage involves combat operations, 7) Deception manipulates enemy perceptions about friendly force intentions, positions, and timing.

25. This term is used in Army Doctrine instead of MOOTW.

26. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington D.C., May 1995), 3-0.

27. Ibid. 3-2 to 3-4.

28. Ibid. 1-5.

29. FM 100-5, 6-2.

30. FM 100-7, 1-9.

31. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 100-15, *Corps Operations*, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington D.C., June 1996), 1-2.

32. FM, 101-5-1/MCRP 5-2A, 1-120.

33. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, (Headquarter, Department of the Army, Washington D.C., Dec, 1994), 1.

34. Ibid. 31, and 43.

35. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 7-98, *Operations In a Low-Intensity Conflict*, (Department of the Army, Washington D.C., Oct 1992), 1-3.

36. Joint Publication (JP) III, *Operations*, Joint Electronic Library, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1 Feb 1995), Chapter III, 9-22.

37. Colin L. Powell, General, "A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts", Joint Electronic Library, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office 23 November 1992), 2.

38. Joint Publication III, xi. Synergy. Integrate and synchronize operations in a manner that applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. Simultaneity and Depth. Bring force to bear on the opponent's entire structure in a near simultaneous manner to overwhelm and cripple capabilities and the enemy's will to resist. Anticipation. Remain alert for the unexpected opportunities to exploit the situations. Balance. Refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the joint force, as well as the nature and timing of operations conducted to disrupt an enemy's balance. Leverage. Gain, maintain, and exploit advantages in combat power across all dimensions. Timing and Tempo. Conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy. Operation Reach and Approach. Basing, whether from overseas locations, sea-based platforms, or the continental United States, directly affects operational reach. In particular, advanced bases underwrite the progressive ability of the joint force to shield its components from enemy action and deliver symmetric blows with increasing power and ferocity. Forces and Functions. Campaigns and operations can focus on defeating either enemy forces or functions, or a combination of both. Arranging Operations. The best arrangement will often be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to achieve the desired end state conditions quickly and at the least cost in personnel and other resources. Centers of Gravity. The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the enemy's sources of power in order to destroy or neutralize them.

39. *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Electronic Library, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 28 Feb 1995), 5.

40. Ibid. 6.

41. John L. Hirsch, and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 44.

42. Written After Action Report, *U.S. Army Forces, Somalia*, Headquarters 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, (Fort Drum NY, 2 Jan 1993), 5.

43. Ibid. 6.

44. Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, (Ft. McNair, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 75.

45. Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, Lessons Learned 3 December 1992-4 May 1993*, U.S. Army Combined Arms Command (CAC), (Fort Leavenworth, KS, November, 1993), 5.

46. Allard, 4.

47. Hirsch, and Oakley, 54.

48. Written after Action Report, *U.S. Army Forces, Somalia*, 4.

49. *Operation RESTORE HOPE, Lessons Learned 3 Dec 1992- 4 May 1993*, I-17.

50. Hirsch and Oakley, 47.

51. *Operation RESTORE HOPE, Lessons Learned 3 Dec 1992- 4 May 1993*, I-14.

52. Written after Action Report, *U.S. Army Forces, Somalia*, 34.

53. Ibid. 39.

54. *Operation RESTORE HOPE, Lessons Learned 3 Dec 1992- 4 May 1993*, I-15.

55. Ibid. I-15.

56. Walter Clarke, and Jeffery Herbst., "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention." *Foreign Affairs*, (Volume 75, No.2, March/April 1996), 71.

57. Andrew S. Natsios, "Commanders' Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies." *Parameters XXVI*, (no 2 Summer 1996), 61.

58. Walter S. Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia." *Parameters XXIII*, (no. 4, Winter 1993-94), 58.

59. Natsios, 57.

60. J. F. O. McAllister, "Pity the Peacekeepers", *Time*, (28 June 1993), 47.
61. Clarke and Herbst, 77.
62. Allard, 45.
63. Written after Action Report, *U.S. Army Forces, Somalia*, 1.
- I-12. 64. *Operation RESTORE HOPE, Lessons Learned 3 Dec 1992- 4 May 1993*, 5.
65. Written after Action Report, *U.S. Army Forces, Somalia*, 5.
66. Allard, 44.
67. Ibid. 49.
- II-13. 68. *Operation RESTORE HOPE, Lessons Learned 3 Dec 1992- 4 May 1993*, 5.
69. Ibid. II-10.
70. Allard, 51.
71. Ibid. 47.
72. Robert F. Baumann, "Operation Uphold Democracy: Power Under Control" *Military Review*, (July-August, 1997), 14.
73. Written After Action Report, *Operation Uphold Democracy, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (Light Infantry)*, (Headquarters 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, Fort Drum: NY), 4.
74. Fishel, John T., "Operation Uphold Democracy: Old Principles, New Realities", *Military Review*, (July-August, 1997), 22.
75. *Operation Uphold Democracy, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (Light Infantry)*, 10.
76. Donald E. Schulz, *Haiti Update*, (Carlisle Barracks PA: U.S. Army War College, 1997), 13.
77. Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Operation Uphold Democracy, Lessons Learned Report, December 1994, Haiti*, (U.S. Army Combined Arms Command (CAC), Fort Leavenworth: KS), 11.

78. Robert C. Shaw, Major, U.S. Army, "Integrating Conventional and Special Operations Forces", *Military Review*, (July-August 1997), 38.

79. *Operation Uphold Democracy, Lessons Learned Report, December 1994*, 155.

80. C520 Syllabus, *Military Operations Other Than War*, (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth: KS, 1997), 141.

81. Fishel, 23.

82. Ibid. 24.

83. *Operation Uphold Democracy, Lessons Learned Report, December 1994*, 60.

84. Fishel, 25.

85. *Operation Uphold Democracy, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (Light Infantry)*, 6.

86. Ibid. 6.

87. *Operation Uphold Democracy, Lessons Learned Report, December 1994*, 121-126.

88. Ibid. 119.

89. Fishel, 23.

90. *Operation Uphold Democracy, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (Light Infantry)*, 6.

91. Baumann, 16.

92. Schneider, *Vulcans Anvil: The American Civil War and Emergence of Operational Art*, 30.

93. Ibid. 65.

94. Ibid. 61.

95. FM 100-7, 1-9.

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